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This paper examines empirically the relationship between the internal technological profile and the 
diversification through strategic alliances of the largest 219 industrial firms world-wide. It explores three 
related issues. First, the paper shows that firms’ internal technological diversification is more pronounced 
than external technological diversification. Second, it confirms the idea that technological diversification is 
more pronounced than product and market diversification. Finally, by means of multiple correlation analysis, 
this work studies the relationship between firms’ economic performance, internal technological 
diversification and diversification through strategic alliances. The empirical investigation combines firm level 
data on US patents, strategic technological alliances, production and marketing alliances, and firms’ economic 
performances. 
1. Introduction 
Over the 1980s firms and industries have experienced a process of “technological convergence” 
or “technology fusion” (Rosenberg, 1976; Kodama, 1986, 1992). Due to the complexity and multi-
technology nature of products, different firms and industries came to share similar and wider 
technological bases (Granstrand and Sjolander, 1990; Granstrand and Oskarsson, 1994; Granstrand 
et al., 1997; Patel and Pavitt, 1997). In many cases these wider technological bases are achieved 
through firms’ technological diversification.  
Unlike technological diversification, product diversification decreased over time through the 
processes of restructuring and refocusing of large diversified firms (Scott, 1993; Hoskisson and Hitt, 
1994; Markides, 1995a). Empirical work witnessed the difference between technological 
diversification and product diversification (Granstrand, 1997; Granstrand et al., 1997) suggesting 
that while in principle multi-technology firms can develop a wide range of different products, there 
are severe limitations to the acquisitions of the downstream assets needed to produce and 
commercialise products in a high number of different markets (Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998).   2
One way to get access to competencies that firms lack internally is by developing linkages with 
other companies. During the past two decades a number of studies in the economic and managerial 
literature have focused on the extent, motivations and characteristics of strategic alliances (Kogut, 
1988; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Hagedoorn, 1993; Dunning, 1993, 1995). There is also 
empirical evidence showing that the increasing technological diversification of firms is frequently 
associated with the use of strategic alliances (Mowery et al., 1998). 
 
Based on these literature, our paper explores empirically the relationship between firms’ internal 
technological profile – internal technological diversification – and diversification through strategic 
alliances – external diversification – in Europe, USA and Japan. It examines some stylised facts 
highlighted in the literature about technological diversification, market diversification and strategic 
alliances, and explores the relationship between diversification strategies and firms’ performances. 
More specifically, this work looks at three issues.  
It first describes the extent of firms’ internal technological diversification vs. external 
technological diversification. We believe that firms invest internally in developing a wider range of 
technological competencies compared to external agreements. This is because the internalisation of 
knowledge aims at both enhancing firms’ core-competencies, and at creating absorptive capacities to 
acquire technologies developed by others.  
Second, it shows that technological diversification is more pronounced than product and market 
diversification. Although firms develop competencies in several technological fields they may find it 
difficult to access production and commercialisation assets for entering different businesses.  
Finally, the paper studies the relationship between firms’ economic performance, internal 
technological diversification and external technological diversification. Most of the literature focuses 
on the impact of related and unrelated product diversification on firm performance. The results 
indicate that related diversifiers outperform unrelated diversifiers (Robins and Wiersema, 1995; 
Berger and Ofek, 1995; Markides and Williamson, 1994; Varadarajan and Ramanujam, 1987; 
Dubofsky and Varadarajan, 1987), and that refocusing has a positive effect on firms’ performance 
(Markides, 1995a; Comment and Jarrell, 1995). We expect technological diversification to be   
positively correlated with firms’ performance in specific sectors like transportation equipment where 
product development requires the integration of a wider range of different technologies compared 
to sectors like the ICTs. 
 
To analyse these issues we combine firm level data on technological diversification, strategic 
alliances and economic performance in 13 industrial sectors from 1990 to 1997. The empirical 
analysis is based on a world-wide sample of 219 industrial firms selected from the largest 500   3
companies (Fortune 500, 1998-1999). For each company we collected information about the internal 
technological profile (internal diversification) and external alliances (external diversification). We assume 
that internal technological competencies of firms are reflected in the relative number of patents 
granted in each sector. Therefore, patents granted to our 219 companies are used to define their 
internal technological configuration. Strategic alliances are used to trace their external strategies in 
technology and production related operations. Firm level data are drawn from three datasets. 
USPTO patent data in the period 1990-1997 are used to measure firms’ internal technological 
diversification (Techline, 1999). These patents are classified in 27 technological classes. 
Data on strategic alliances are drawn from the SDC database (Securities Data Company). These 
data are used to measure technological diversification by external operations, and diversification in 
production and marketing activities. The SDC database on joint-ventures, strategic alliances and 
licensing provides information on about 115,000 agreements. We selected 12,342 alliances signed by 
our sample companies during the period 1990-1997, and collected several information on the 
agreements. By using the SIC codes of the alliance we classified each operation by business sector. 
We then developed a concordance table between the 27 technological classes in which patents are 
classified and the SIC codes of the alliances in the manufacturing sectors. Alliances in the service 
sectors, with the exception of telecommunication (SIC 4800) and software (SIC 7370), are excluded 
from the analysis. According to their content, alliances were also classified as technological alliances and 
production and marketing alliances.  
Finally, the Compustat database provides information on firms’ economic performance.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the background literature on 
technological diversification and strategic alliances. It focuses on the issues that will be explored in 
the empirical sections. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 compares internal and external 
technological diversification to the diversification through production and marketing alliances 
during 1990-1997. Section 5 develops a multiple correlation analysis to study the relationship 
between internal and external diversification, and economic performance. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  On technological diversification and strategic alliances. 
A number of contributions explore firms’ technological and business diversification. As far as 
technological diversification is concerned, these studies show that during the past decades the 
complexity and multi-technology nature of products and processes led firms to broaden their 
technological base in order to develop new products and processes (Granstrand and Sjolander, 1990; 
Patel and Pavitt, 1994; Granstrand and Oskarsson, 1994; Granstrand et al., 1997). The literature   4
suggests that firms might develop technologies that are different but highly interdependent with 
their distinctive capabilities. They can also invest in complementary fields in order to be able to 
adopt and integrate technologies developed by external suppliers. Moreover, firms may want to 
develop some knowledge in non-core technologies in order to have a window on emerging 
technological opportunities. Or, still, they can internalise some “general purpose technologies” 
which are used in different products and processes. 
Some authors, however, point out that firms’ technological profiles are difficult to change. They 
tend to be stable over time and evolve in a path-dependent fashion according to strong inter-
sectoral differences. Furthermore, firms that successfully diversify technologically maintain a certain 
coherence between existing and new fields (Patel and Pavitt, 1997; Teece et al., 1994; Breschi et al., 
1998).  
Unlike technological diversification, product diversification decreased over time due to the 
process of restructuring and refocusing of large diversified firms (Scott, 1993; Hoskisson and Hitt, 
1994; Markides, 1995a). Hence, firms broaden their technological knowledge, but they do not use all 
their competence to enter new businesses. Empirical studies witness the difference between 
technological diversification and product diversification (Granstrand, 1997; Granstrand et al., 1997). 
Some of them point out that while in principle multi-technology firms can develop a wide range of 
different products, there are severe limitations to the acquisitions of the downstream assets needed 
to produce and commercialise these products in many different markets (Gambardella and Torrisi, 
1998). Other studies focus on the impact of related and unrelated product diversification on firm 
performance. The results indicate that related diversifiers outperform unrelated diversifiers (Robins 
and Wiersema, 1995; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Markides and Williamson, 1994; Varadarajan and 
Ramanujam, 1987; Dubofsky and Varadarajan, 1987), and that refocusing has a positive effect on 
firms’ performance (Markides, 1995a; Comment and Jarrell, 1995).  
A branch of the literature on technological diversification focuses on the strategies that firms 
adopt to build up technological competencies internally. The distribution of patents across 
technological classes is used to measure the extent to which firms diversify technologically. In-house 
R&D investment, however, is not the only means that firms can use to enlarge their technological 
base. External collaborations help acquire competencies that are more “exogenous” to the firm 
(Hagedoorn and Duysters, 1999). They are a means to strengthen firms’ critical technological 
competencies, to acquire general purpose technologies that companies do not develop internally, to 
get access to frontier technologies produced by firms in other sectors, and to expand knowledge in 
complementary or more marginal fields. Some contributions explore the trade-off between the 
internal development and the “outsourcing” of technologies. Richardson (1972) suggests that similar 
and complementary activities should be maintained within the firm, while activities which are   5
complementary but dissimilar can be accessed externally. Prahalad and Hamel (1990) claim that 
firms should invest internally in related areas or in core technologies, and use external alliances to 
acquire technological competencies in unrelated areas or in non core technologies. In addition, firms 
can use strategic alliances to get access to new and complementary technologies (Teece, 1986), to 
speed up firms’ learning processes, to share the costs and risks of R&D activities, to exploit 
economies of scale and scope in research, to access new markets or production facilities, or to 
monitor the evolution of non core-technologies (Hagedoorn, 1993). These issues have been studied 
intensively during the past two decades, when there has been a steep increase in the use of 
collaborative agreements between domestic firms in related markets and foreign companies in global 
markets (von Tunzelmann, 1995; Freeman and Hagedoorn, 1994; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 
1993; Chesnais, 1988).  
This paper focuses on strategic alliances as a means to exchange technological knowledge and 
other downstream assets. The “competence-based” theories of the firm provide a valid support to 
the study of this issue. The basic idea is that economic institutions have different abilities to support 
the acquisition and development of knowledge or other assets. These abilities are firm-specific, they 
are cumulative, and determine firms’ competitive advantages. Inter-firm linkages can help combine 
these firm-specific assets that require time to build up and that are hard to reproduce. Moreover, 
since the shared assets can be accessed without separating them from the developer firm, the 
problem of tradability is also bypassed (see, for example, Richardson, 1972; Kogut and Zander, 
1992). 
The empirical evidence suggests that various factors influence the choice between different types 
of external agreements, such as the pace of technological change, the complexity and the objectives 
of the transaction. Pisano (1991) and Teece (1992) demonstrate that when technological change 
proceeds fast, companies prefer flexible forms of organisation – i.e. strategic alliances vs. mergers 
and acquisitions. Other contributions show that in industries characterised by rapid technological 
change, the scope for learning, the organisational change and the quick strategic response require 
flexible forms of organisation (Hagedoorn, 1993; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). By contrast, 
when transactions are complex, hierarchical organisations have superior monitoring and incentive 
aligning properties. Some contributions also shows that the larger the number of partners, the 
broader the product and/or technology scope, and the wider the functional activities covered by an 
alliance, the higher the likelihood of the alliance being a joint venture or, more generally, an equity 
arrangement (Pisano, 1989; Garcia Canal, 1996; Oxley, 1997). Even though the empirical evidence 
on the relationship between the technological content and the organisational form of the alliances 
are mixed (Osborn and Baughn, 1990; Gulati, 1995), the preference for more hierarchical 
arrangements is more likely also when firms develop or transfer tacit know-how.    6
To conclude, in recent years there has been a trend towards the increasing technological 
diversification of firms and the intensification in the use of strategic technological alliances. 
Although the relationship between technological diversification and firms’ performances deserves 
further attention, so far the empirical results suggest that there is a positive correlation between the 
two. The same positive relationship holds for strategic technological alliances and firms’ 
performances, although the results are not clear across sectors (Hagedoorn and Shakenraad, 1994). 
By contrast, firms’ performances are positively affected by the process of refocusing and 
restructuring of productin and marketing activities (among others Markides, 1995a,b; Montgomery 
and Wernerfelf, 1988; Amit and Livnat, 1988; Hitt and Ireland, 1986).  
 
This work adds empirical evidence to some of these issues. It investigates the relationship 
between  internal technological diversification and diversification through strategic alliances, and 
highlights differences across countries and sectors. It also explores the relationship between internal 
and external technological diversification and firms’ economic performances.  More specifically, we 
explore the following issues. 
First, the paper compares firms’ internal technological diversification with  external technological 
diversification. We expect the former to be more pronounced than the latter. Firms develop in-house 
critical technologies and try to maintain a frontier position in these fields. However, the multi-
technology nature of products and processes leads companies to internalise knowledge in a wider 
range of technological fields. Competencies developed internally are also needed to evaluate, 
understand and assimilate outside technologies (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990; Rosenberg, 1990), 
and allow firms to guide the evolution of external collaborations by avoiding that the partners 
entirely shape the scope of the relationships.  
Second, this work compares firms’ internal technological diversification with external market diversification 
(see also Granstrand, 1997; Patel and Pavitt, 1994, 1997; Granstrand et al., 1997). The expectation is 
that internal technological diversification is more pronounced than external market diversification. 
Although firms develop competencies in several technological fields, they may find it difficult to get 
access to production and commercialisation assets for entering different markets (Gambardella and 
Torrisi, 1998). The internalisation of a wide range of technologies does not imply the presence in 
“all potential” markets in which these technologies can be applied. Entry in different markets 
requires investments in downstream assets, some of which are extremely specific.  
Third, by means of multiple correlation analysis, this paper describes the relationship between 
firms’ performances, internal technological diversification, and diversification through strategic 
alliances. We expect the results to be sector-specific, with some sectors like transportation 
equipment displaying a positive correlation between firms’ performances and technological   7
diversification. This is because, compared to industries like the ICTs, the transportation equipment 
sector requires the integration of a wider range of different technologies to develop the products.  
3. Data   
The empirical analysis focuses on a sample of 219 manufacturing firms. We drawn 265 industrial 
firms from the Fortune Global 500 (1998-1999). From this sample we selected the 219 firms for 
which we have information on patents and alliances. Fifty firms are European, 121 are American, 48 
are Japanese, 4 are from South Korea and 2 from Canada. We used the company primary SIC code 
(Standard Industrial Classification) to classify each firm in one of the 13 industrial sectors as shown 
in the Appendix (Table A1).  
For each company we collected information about the internal technological profile – internal 
diversification – and external alliances – external diversification. We assume that internal technological 
competencies of firms are reflected in the relative number of patents granted in different sectors1. 
Therefore, patents granted to our sample companies are used to define their internal technological 
configuration. We use strategic alliances to trace their external strategies in technology and 
production related operations2.  
The empirical analysis is based on three sources of data. 
Patent data are drawn from the Techline database that provides data on patents issued by the 
American Patent Office in 1990-1999. The total number of patents issued to our 219 sample 
companies from 1990 to 1997 is 309,574. The distribution of patents by region and sector is shown 
in the Appendix (Table A2). The technologies in which firms patent are classified according to 27 
technological classes as described in Table A3 of the Appendix.  
Data on strategic alliances are drawn from the SDC database (Securities Data Company, 1999). The 
SDC database on joint-ventures, strategic alliances and licensing provides information on about 
115,000 agreements. We selected 12,342 agreements signed by our sample companies from 1990 to 
1997, and collected information about the primary SIC code of the participants, the activity 
developed within the alliance,  the location of the participants, the technological content of the 
alliance, the direction of the technology flow, and all SIC codes in which the alliance is classified. By 
using the SIC codes of the alliance we also classified each operation by industrial sector and by one 
of the 27 technological classes in which patents are codified. The Appendix (Table A3) shows the 
concordance table between technological fields – in which patents are classified – and the SIC codes 
of the alliances in the manufacturing sectors, as indicated by the SDC database. Alliances in the 
                                                           
1 We are aware of the limitations of patent-based proxies for measuring firms’ innovative activity, and for comparing 
sectors and countries’ innovative output. For a review see Griliches (1990). 
2 Company-level aggregation of subsidiaries was performed before selecting the data.   8
service sectors, with the exception of telecommunication (SIC 4800) and software (SIC 7370) are 
excluded from the analysis. 
Alliances are then distinguished into:  
−   production and marketing alliances: alliances aimed at obtaining downstream assets in 
marketing and production activities – i.e. Joint Marketing and Joint Manufacturing operations. 
The total number of market alliances is 5,840. 
−   technological alliances: alliances in which some technological knowledge is exchanged trough 
technology transfer or joint innovative projects – i.e. Licensing Agreements and Joint Research 
Agreements. The number of technological alliances is 6,502. Technological alliances are divided 
into alliances through which firms acquire technological knowledge and alliances through which 
firms transfer their knowledge to third parties. To differentiate between these two types of 
alliances we use the information on the direction of the technological flow involved in the 
alliance. The analysis below will focus only on the alliances used to acquire knowledge.  
The distribution of technological and production alliances is shown in Tables A4-A5 in Appendix 1. 
 
One problem in comparing firms’ internal and external diversification concerns the use of 
different measures for the two strategies. We use patents to measure internal technological 
diversification, and strategic alliances to describe external technological and market diversification. 
The problem is that these two proxies measure different “objects”, and that one patent is something 
smaller and technologically more specific than one alliance. Symmetrically, an alliance includes a 
wider range of activities and technologies compared to a patent. This means that the comparison 
between the number of sectors in which firms patent and the number of sectors in which they 
develop alliances could be biased because we are not comparing similar objects as it could be by 
comparing the patents produced by in-house R&D, and those generated by developing 
technological alliances. In other words, one would need data on the number and classes of patents 
developed internally, and the number and classes of patents developed by using external agreements. 
Unfortunately, these data are not available.  
To mitigate this problem, a possible solution is to use the information provided by SDC on all 
technologies and sectors involved in each alliance. For each operation we have the number and the 
sectoral classification of the different technological “components”. By using the SIC codes of these 
“components” we disaggregate each operation in different technologies, from 1 to 11 sectoral 
classes. This allow us to compare the number and classes of patents with the number and classes of 
alliances of the 219 companies in the sample.    9
4.  Technological diversification and alliances 
This section compares firms’ internal technological profile with their propensity to engage in 
external alliances. We use Herfindahl indexes as indicators of diversification. The internal 
technological diversification (ITD) is proxied by the Herfindahl index of the number of patents of 
each firm in the 27 technological classes shown in Appendix 1 (Table A3). The external 
technological diversification (ETD) is measured by the Herfindahl index of the number of 
technological alliances in the same 27 technological classes. Finally, the external diversification in 
production & marketing activities (EPMD) is measured by the Herfindahl index of the number of 
production and marketing alliances in the 27 classes. The index ranges between 0 and 1. A value 
close to 1 indicates that firms concentrate patents or alliances in few technological classes or only in 
one technological class when the index is equal to 1. The lower the index, the higher the degree of 
diversification. 
Table 1 shows the average Herfindhal indexes by sector for the period 1990-19973. On average, 
firms are less diversified externally than internally. The Herfindhal index for ITD is 0,24 compared 
to 0,46 and 0,50 for ETD and EPMD. In other words, firms produce patents in a wider range of 
sectors than those in which they develop external technological and production & marketing 
agreements. We will explore further the relationship between internal and external diversification 
later in this section. 
There are cross sectoral differences in the level of diversification. Firms in the ICTs and 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries are more focused internally (ITD) than companies in the 
transportation equipment, metal, machinery and electrical equipment sectors. The same applies for 
ETD. As far as EPMD is concerned, chemical and pharmaceutical firms are more diversified than 
the sample average, while firms in the transportation equipment sector are more focused than the 
average. 
 
                                                           
3 We also calculated the Concentration Ratio for patents and alliances by firms and sectors. The results are consistent 
with the Herfindahl indexes.    10
Table 1. Herfindahl indexes by sector, 1990-1997 
 ITD: 
Herfindhal 





















































































*Standard deviations in parenthesis  
Source: Techline (1999) and SDC (1999). 
 
Table 2 shows the Herfindhal indexes by macro-regions. The differences across regions are less 
marked than those across sectors. Japanese firms are more diversified technologically (ITD and 
ETD) than the European and the American ones, while European and Japanese firms are more 
diversified in production & marketing alliances (EPMD) than American firms. However, these 
patterns may reflect sectoral differences. The multiple correlation analysis performed in Section 5 
will better highlight sectoral and country differences.  
   11
Table 2. Herfindahl indexes by country, 1990-1997 
  ITD:  Herfindhal 
index – average by 
region 
Nr. of firms ETD: Herfindhal 
index – average by 
region  
Nr. of firms EPMD: 
Herfindhal index 






































Total  0,24 
(0,14) 
219  0,46 
(0,24) 
203  0,50 
(0,26) 
211 
*Standard deviations in parenthesis  
Source: Techline (1999) and SDC (1999). 
 
We now turn to the relationship between firms’ internal and external technological 
diversification (ITD and ETD). Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients among the three 
indexes of diversification calculated at the firm level. They are all positive and significant, suggesting 
that firms that diversify technologically, also diversify in marketing and production activities, and 
that internal technological diversification is associated with external technological diversification at 
the firm level.  
Table 3. Pearson correlation of Herfindahl indexes (firm-level elaborations), 1990-1997 
 ITD ETD EMPD 
ITD  1,000 (219)     
ETD  0,338 (203)  1,000 (203)   
EMPD  0,434 (211)  0,472 (198)  1,000 (219) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed). Number of observations in parenthesis. 
Source: Techline (1999) and SDC (1999). 
 
Figures 1-3 show the position of each firm in terms of ITD, ETD and EMPD. Figure 1 shows 
the scatter diagram of internal and external technological diversification of firms. With the exception 
of a few companies, most firms are located below the diagonal of the graph, meaning that the 
Herfindahl indexes for patents (ITD) are lower than the Herfindahl indexes for technological 
alliances (ETD). This suggests that large firms have, on average, a more diversified internal than 
external technological profile. This is consistent with the multi-technology view of products and 
processes that leads firms to internalise knowledge in different fields in order to develop new 
products and processes. It is also consistent with the idea that firms invest internally to improve   12
knowledge in different fields, both “core” and marginal ones, and to absorb technologies acquired 
externally. The few firms above the diagonal in Figure 1 are less diversified internally than externally. 
Some of them, like AT&T, Bell Atlantic, MCI WorldCom, Cisco System in the ICT and electronic 
sectors are very focused internally and much more diversified in terms of technological alliances. 
Finally, the Herfindahl index for ETD is 1 for a small group of firms. However, since the total 
number of alliances of these firms ranges between 1 and 8, the value of the Herfindahl does not 
necessarily reflect a strategy of technology focusing. Some of these firms are also very diversified 
internally. 
Figure 1 also highlights the cross-sectoral differences shown in Table 1. The less diversified 
firms, both internally and externally, are in the ICT sectors and in the software industry (e.g. 
Microsoft and Oracle). In the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sectors there are both diversified and 
focused companies. Specifically, pharmaceutical companies are less diversified than those in 
chemicals and petrochemicals. The most diversified firms are in the electrical equipment sector (e.g. 
General Electric) and in the transportation equipment, metal and machinery industries. 
 
Figure 1. ITD vs ETD, 1990-1997 
External Technlogical Diversification 1990-97
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Figure 2 confirms that internal technological diversification is more pronounced than external 
market diversification. The difference between the Herfindahl index for patents and the Herfindahl 
index for production & market alliances is almost always negative. This suggests that large 
companies are, on average, more diversified in developing internal technological competencies than 
in engaging in external market alliances. The sectoral differences are less marked.  
 
Figure 2. ITD vs EPMD, 1990-1997 
External Diversification in Production & Marketing 1990-97





































































































Figure 3 compares firms’ diversification in technological alliances and market alliances. It 
confirms the positive correlation between the two Herfindhal indexes as many companies are 
located around the diagonal. There are, however, cross-sectoral differences. Pharmaceutical and 
petrochemical companies diversify in production & marketing alliances more than in technological 
alliances. Firms in the ICTs and in the automotive and aerospace sectors are more diversified in 
developing technological alliances than in market alliances. Since strategic alliances might be a 
strategy to integrate or strengthen firms’ internal competencies, these large firms broaden their 
technological competencies more than they do with their business portfolio. This is consistent with 
the idea that, even though a multi-technology firm might develop a wide range of products, it would 
find it extremely difficult to acquire the downstream competencies needed to enter different 
markets. Gambardella and Torrisi (1998) reach similar results in the electronics industry. They find   14
that technological convergence in the computer, telecommunication, electronic and electrical 
equipment industries is not followed by a similar degree of diversification in downstream activities. 
 
Figure 3. ETD vs. EPMD, 1990-1997 
External Diversification in Production & Marketing 1990-97



































































   
 
To sum up, there is a positive correlation between internal and external technological 
diversification, and between technological diversification and diversification in production and 
marketing activities. However, some questions remain unanswered on the goals that firms pursue 
when they engage in external collaborations. For example, do firms invest externally in 
complementary or “non core” technologies which are not developed internally? Do firms invest 
internally in building up the absorptive capacity for acquiring technologies through external 
agreements? Do firms invest both internally and externally in critical technologies? In which sectors 
do firms use alliances for accessing production and marketing assets?  
A deeper inspection in our data, and specifically a look into the set of technologies in which each 
firm patents and develops alliances helps answering these questions. For each company in the 
sample we identified the technological class with the largest number of patents, technological 
alliances and production and marketing alliances. We then computed the correlation coefficient 
among these top classes in the two sub-periods 1990-1993 and 1994-1997. 
The correlation coefficients between the top technological classes in which the 219 companies   15
produce patents and engage in external collaborations are all positive and significant, suggesting that 
in many cases large firms concentrate patents and alliances in the same technological classes. 
However, these correlation coefficients decrease substantially from 1990-1993 to 1994-1997. While 
in 1990-1993 firms engaged in technological alliances in the same fields in which they patented, in 
1994-1997 firms developed technological alliances in more diversified and complementary 
technologies compared to their core technologies. 
 
Table 4. Spearman correlation between top technological classes in ITD, ETD, EMPD (firm-level 
elaboration), 1990-1993 and 1994-1997 
 ITD ETD EMPD 
 1990-1993 
ITD  1,000 (219)     
ETD  0,831 (219)  1,000 (219)   
EMPD  0,626 (190)  0,597 (190)  1,000 (190) 
 1994-1997 
ITD  1,000 (219)     
ETD  0,583 (192)  1,000 (192)   
EMPD  0,680 (201)  0,620 (179)  1,000 (201) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed). Number of observations in parenthesis. 
Source: Techline (1999) and SDC (1999). 
 
There are, however, cross-sectoral differences. In the aerospace, electrical equipment, machinery, 
metal and petrochemical sectors, the top classes in which firms patent are the same as those in 
which they engage in alliances in a lower number of cases compared to firms in the chemical, 
pharmaceutical, computer and telecommunication sectors. 
We can go a step forward in this analysis by comparing the top three technological classes in 
which each firm patents and develops technological alliances. In the ICT and electronic sectors – 
which includes computer, semiconductor, telecommunication, electrical equipment and other 
electronics – patents and technological alliances are concentrated in the same three technological 
classes. These classes are computers, telecommunications and semiconductors. Moreover, firms 
from all sectors in the electrical-electronic filiere develop a large share of external alliances among them. 
This process leads to a sort of technological convergence among the electrical-electronic companies. 
Only firms in the electrical equipment sector behave differently. They receive a large share of 
technologies from all the ICT sectors, but they are rarely the source of technologies to firms from 
the other sectors. Finally, alliances in other fields are very rare for the ICT firms, while companies in 
the electrical equipment and electronic sectors develop a high share of alliances in the chemical,   16
pharmaceutical, automotive, aerospace, machinery and metal sectors.  
Patents and alliances in chemical technologies show up in the top three positions for most of the 
firms in petrochemicals, chemicals and pharmaceuticals – the chemical filiere. This suggests that 
chemical technologies provide general and basic knowledge that cut across the three sectors in the 
filiere.  
Second, in the pharmaceutical sector the top three technological classes in which firms patent 
are the same in which firms develop technological agreements. By contrast, in chemicals and 
petrochemicals, only one technological class is both in the top ranking for patents and technological 
alliances. This suggests that while pharmaceutical companies concentrate their innovative efforts in 
the same fields in which they also develop external technological agreements, petrochemical and 
chemical firms do differently. They focus internally on some technologies (i.e. chemicals, oil and 
plastics for petrochemical firms; chemicals, plastics and office equipment for chemical firms), and 
develop external linkages in other fields (chemicals, glass and pharmaceuticals in the case of 
petrochemical firms; pharmaceuticals, chemicals and computers in the case of chemical firms). 
Hence, the “convergence” between internal and external diversification strategies in these two 
industries is lower than in the pharmaceutical sector.  
A third remark concerns the pattern toward the “downward specialisation” in the chemical and 
petrochemical sectors. By “downward specialisation” we mean that firms in the petrochemical 
sector enter the chemical sector, and that firms in the chemical sector move downward into the 
pharmaceutical sector. Both patents and alliances confirm this pattern. This is consistent with the 
history of the chemical industry in the past decades. Due to increased competition, firms’ 
profitability in the chemical industry started to decline in the early 1960s. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
the oil shocks, the entry of competitors from the developing countries, the slower demand growth, 
the diminishing opportunities for product innovation made the profitability decline become a severe 
problem. Firms in a large number of chemical markets, especially basic intermediates, experienced 
excess-capacity. To solve their problems, firms started a process of restructuring. A number of 
companies in the US and Europe exited from the commodity chemical businesses, and moved into 
downstream sectors. In their place, many oil companies took over existing commodity chemical 
firms. This process led firms to specialise either on commodity chemicals, or on more downstream 
specialty sectors. The restructuring process occurred through a large number of inter-firm alliances 
and acquisitions, both in production and R&D (Arora and Gambardella, 1998). 
 A different example is given by the transportation equipment sectors, in which patents and 
alliances occur in different technological classes. The aerospace is a typical sector integrator of 
technologies for the realisation of a final complex product-system (i.e. aircraft, engine, missile). 
Firms in the aerospace sector internally develop process technologies, industrial machinery,   17
industrial process equipment and electronic equipment. External technological alliances occur for 
the joint development of aircraft technologies, motivated by the exceptionally high costs of R&D 
projects and for the acquisition of other technologies to be integrated (i.e. computing, electronics). 
The technical classes in which firms concentrates the largest share of patents are different across 
firms in the aerospace, while in most cases firms develop technological and production and 
marketing alliances in the aerospace & parts technologies. 
By contrast, in the automotive industry, firms develop a larger share of alliances in the same 
sector in which they patent (motor vehicles technologies). A small number of alliances are used to 
get access to technologies and market assets in electronics, telecommunications, computers, 
semiconductors, electrical equipment, machinery and metal.  
Firms in the machinery industry show a pattern similar to that in the automotive industry 
However, the motivation that leads firms to establish a high number of collaborations with firms in 
other sectors are different from those that command the pattern of alliances in the automotive and 
aerospace sectors. The aerospace and aircraft sectors are integrators of technologies developed by 
others. They develop technological, production and market alliances to acquire knowledge that has 
to be integrated into the final products or processes. By contrast, the machinery sector is a 
transversal sector where firms develop alliances with firms in other sectors that are “users” of their 
products.   
A final point concerns the pervasiveness and the general purpose nature of the information 
technologies (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995). It is interesting that in non-IT sectors – such as the 
automotive, aerospace, machinery and chemical sectors – computer technologies and software show 
up in the top positions of technological alliances.  
5.  Diversification and economic performance 
This section performs a multiple correlation exercise by means of OLS regressions. The purpose 
of these regressions is to describe the relationship between firms’ performance and diversification 
strategies. We use a panel composed of 219 companies over 8 years during the period 1990-1997. 
From the Compustat database we collected various measures of performance. In order to check for 
the robustness of our results we performed five OLS regressions that use different measures of 
performance as dependent variables. Specifically, the regressions use as dependent variables the 
return on invested capital, the return on total equity, the return on total assets, the gross profit 
margin, and the “Tobin’s q” given by the ratio between the firm’s market value and its book value. 
The regressors are our measures of internal and external diversification, the number of firms’ 
patents and alliances in each year, the sales of the firms as controls for their size, and country,   18
sectoral and time dummies4. Table 5 lists the variables of the regressions. All these variables are 
expressed in logs. The results of the econometric estimates are shown in Table 6.  
 
Table 5. List of variables 
Return on Invested 
Capital 
Income Before Extraordinary Items divided by Invested Capital multiplied by 100 -- 
1990-1997 
Return on Total 
Equity 
Income Before Extraordinary Items divided by the average of the most recent two 
years of Shareholders' Equity – Total multiplied by 100 -- 1990-1997 
Return on Total Assets  Income Before Extraordinary Items divided by the average of the most recent two 
years of Assets – Total.  This result is multiplied by 100 -- 1990-1997 
Gross Profit Margin  Total Revenue minus Cost of Goods Sold divided by Total Revenue*100 -- 1990-1997 
Tobin’s q  Market Value (Monthly Close Price multiplied by Common Shares Outstanding) 
divided by Book value -- 1990-1997 
Herf ITD  Internal technological diversification (ITD) proxied by the Herfindahl index of the 
annual number of patents assigned to each firm in the 27 technological classes shown 
in Appendix 1 (Table 3a) -- 1990-1997 
Herf ETD  External technological diversification (ETD) measured by the Herfindahl index of the 
annual number of firms’ technological alliances in the 27 technological classes shown 
in Appendix 1 (Table 3a) -- 1990-1997 
Herf EMPD  External diversification in production & marketing activities (EPMD) measured by the 
Herfindahl index of the annual number of production and marketing alliances in the 
27 classes shown in Appendix 1 (Table 3a) -- 1990-1997 
Nr. of Patents  Number of annual patents assigned to each firm in 1990-1997 
Nr. of Tech. alliances  Number of annual technological alliances engaged by each firm in 1990-1997 
Nr. of Production and 
Marketing alliances 
Number of annual alliances in production and marketing engaged by each firm in 
1990-1997 
Sales-turnover  Gross sales reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, returned sales, excise taxes, 
value-added taxes and allowances for which credit is given to customers -- 1990-1997 
Source: Compustat (1998). 
 
Table 6 shows that our three measures of diversification -- Herf ITD, Herf ETD, Herf EMPD -- 
are positively correlated with firms’ performances, meaning that firms that focus have also better 
economic results. However, only the coefficients of Herf ITD in the last three specifications and the 
coefficient of Herf ETD in all five specifications are significant. This suggests that not only do 
companies that focus internally have better performances, but also firms that engage in external 
technological agreements in few sectors have higher performances than companies that develop 
technological alliances in a large number of sectors.  
Also the number of technological alliances is positively correlated with firms’ performances. The 
coefficient of the number of technological alliances is positive and significant across all five 
specifications. Therefore, technological partnership is an effective means to get access to external 
knowledge that firms probably internalize and upon which the firm build up internal competencies 
                                                           
4 We also run the OLS regressions by using different controls for the size of the companies. The results in Table 6 do   19
as suggested by the results in Table 4. This is particularly so if companies concentrate their efforts in 
few technological fields.  
 
Table 6. Estimates of the OLS regressions 
Dependent variables 
  Return on 
invested capital 
Return on total 
equity 























































































Country  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
  767 766 765 773 813 
Adj.  R-squared  0,401 0,382 0,465 0,570 0,534 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Source: Compustat (1998), Techline (1999), SDC (1999). 
 
The coefficient of the number of patents over firms’ performances is positive in four 
regressions, but it is significant only in one of them. This may reflect differences among sectors in 
the importance of technology over economic performance. To explore this issue, we run our 
regressions for each of the eight broad sectors shown in the Appendix 1. Apart from a few 
exceptions, the sectoral results (not shown here) are consistent with the estimates shown in Table 6. 
The coefficient of the number of patents is positive and significant in the chemical and 
pharmaceutical sector and in the electrical equipment sector.  
As far as the internal technological diversification (Herf ITD) is concerned, the coefficient of 
Herf ITD is negative and significant only in the transportation equipment sector. In the other 
sectors, it is either positive and significant (in chemicals and pharmaceuticals and in the ICTs) or 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
not change significantly.    20
negative but not-significant (in the other five sectors). The coefficient of Herf ETD is positive and 
significant in the chemical and pharmaceutical sector. It is negative and significant in the electrical 
equipment industry. In the other sectors the coefficient of Herf ETD is not significant. The 
coefficient of Herf EPMD takes the positive sign in 5 sectors, but it is significant only in the metal 
sector. In the other industries the coefficient of this variable is not significant.  
Finally, the number of technological alliances is positive and significant in chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, in the ICT sector and in transports. The number of alliances in production and 
marketing activities is negative and significant in chemicals and pharmaceuticals and in the “other 
manufacturing sectors”. 
These results are also consistent with another set of regressions (not shown here), in which we 
tested the correlation between the change in the degree of diversification from 1990 to 1997 and 
firms’ economic performances. The results confirm that technological refocusing is positively 
associated with economic performances. 
To sum up, when we run multiple correlation analysis to examine the relationship between firms’ 
performance and the extent to which firms diversify internally and externally, the results indicate 
that: 1) internal technological focusing is positively correlated with firms’ performances; 2) also the 
external technological focusing is positively correlated with firms’ performances; 3) the number of 
technological alliances is positively associated with firms’ economic results. The estimates are also 
robust across different specifications that use different indicators of firms’ performances. It is worth 
noting that these results do not suggest that large firms refocus technologically. Rather, they say that 
less technologically diversified companies have also higher returns on invested capital, higher returns 
on total equity, higher returns on total assets, greater gross profit margins, and higher ratios of 
market value over book value. Better performances and technological focusing is also associated 
with a large number of cooperative agreements to get access to technological knowledge in a 
restricted number of sectors. Hence, firms that go in depth rather than in breadth in technological 
collaborations achieve better economic results.  
A final comment on the estimates in Table 6 concerns the “relatedness” in firms’ diversification 
strategies. Given the level of aggregation of technological classes on which we computed the 
Herfindahl indexes, these results may also suggest that only in very diversified sectors like the 
aerospace and the electrical equipment, internal and external technological diversification is 
positively associated with economic performance, as firms must invest in very different technologies 
for develop their products. In other sectors, our measure of technology focusing may indicate 
strategies of related diversification in several technological sub-fields. In this respect, our results may 
be consistent with the literature on relatedness and coherence in diversification. With respect to the 
effects of strategic alliances, this study suggests that the number of technological alliances is   21
positively correlated with economic performances, when alliances are concentrated in the firms’ core 
technologies. This is also consistent with other studies showing that mergers and acquisitions in 
unrelated sectors negatively affect company performances and lead to divestiture within a few years 
after the acquisition (Porter, 1987; Singh and Montgomery, 1987).  
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to use add empirical evidence on the diversification strategies of large 
firms in different sectors. The paper described the relationship between: 1) internal technological 
diversification and external technological diversification; 2) internal technological diversification and 
external market diversification; 3) firms’ performances and the extent to which they diversify 
internally and externally. 
To explore these issues, we compared the Herfindahl index of firms’ patenting activity across 27 
technological classes, with the Herfindahl index of technological alliances across the same 
technological classes. The results show that large firms from all sectors have, on average, a more 
diversified internal than external technological profile. This is consistent with the multi-technology 
view of the firm.  
The comparison between firms’ Herfindahl index in market alliances and the Herfindahl index in 
patents and technological alliances suggests that firms, on average, diversify more in technological 
alliances than in market alliances – even though there are some inter-sectoral differences. In general 
these results are consistent with existing literature showing that multi-technology firm might find it 
difficult to acquire the downstream competencies needed to enter different markets.  
By simply comparing the top positions in which firms patent and develop technological alliances 
we also described the extent to which firms use strategic alliances to strengthen their internal 
competencies, or to enter different and complementary sectors. This comparison showed that in 
most cases large firms concentrate patents in the same technological classes in which they engage in 
strategic alliances. However, this pattern is more pronounced in sectors like the ICTs, chemicals and 
the pharmaceuticals than in the others. In more diversified sectors, such as the aerospace, electrical 
equipment and machinery,  firms develop a large share of technological and market alliances in 
complementary and non core technologies.  
Finally, the multiple correlation analysis suggested that technological refocusing, both through 
internal and external strategies, is positively associated with firms’ economic performances. The 
number of technological alliances is also positively related with economic performances. Further 
empirical investigation at a more disaggregated technological level may better explore the 
relationship between relatedness in technological diversification and economic performances. This   22
would provide a support to the competence based theories of the firm, to the results on coherent 
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Appendix 1. Sample descriptive statistics and industrial and technological classifications. 
 
Table A1. Number of firms by sector and region  





Chemicals & Pharma  Chemicals  9 3   5 17
Chemicals & Pharma  Petrochemicals  9 2   9 20
Chemicals & Pharma  Pharmaceuticals  5   8 13
Electrical equipment  Electrical equipment  2 4 1  4 11
Electronics Other  electronics  2 10 1  15 28
ICT Computers  1 3   20 24
ICT Telecommunications  2 3   12 17
Machinery Machinery  3   14 17
Metal Metal  7 5   5 17
Other Manufacturing  Food and tobacco  2 2   5 9
Other Manufacturing  Wood and paper    9 9
Transportation equipment  Aerospace  2 1 1  10 14
Transportation equipment  Automotive  8 9 1  5 23
   25 04 2 4   1 2 1 2 1 9
Source: elaborations from SDC (1999) and Techline (1999). 
 
Table A2. Number of patents by sector and region  





Chemicals & Pharma  Chemicals    15037 1776    9734 26547
Chemicals & Pharma  Petrochemicals    6136 851    7902 14889
Chemicals & Pharma  Pharmaceuticals    10542      10260 20802
Electrical equipment  Electrical equipment    2186 21023 3512  10347 37068
Electronics Other  electronics   10071 31236 3274  27246 71827
ICT Computers    91 12228     22542 34861
ICT Telecommunications  1516 1812       14528 17856
Machinery Machinery      8525     11670 20195
Metal Metal    4468 4121     2354 10943
Other Manufacturing  Food and tobacco    2016 270    1366 3652
Other Manufacturing  Wood and paper           2522 2522
Transportation equipment  Aerospace    892 633 416  21118 23059
Transportation equipment  Automotive    6638 10330 925  7460 25353
   1516 59889 90993 8127  149049 309574
Source: elaborations from Techline (1999). 
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Table A3. List of technological classes, and concordance with industrial sectors of alliances. 
  Technological class   
1  Agriculture  Agricolture; Forstry and Fishing. 
2  Oil & Gas, Mining  Metal mining; Coal mining; Petrochemicals (extraction). 
3  Power Generation & Distribution  Electric distribution equipment; Electrical industrial apparatus. 
4  Food & Tobacco  Tobacco; Beverages; Fats and oils; Cane sugar, except refining; Grain mill and 
bakery products; Preservated fruits and vegetables; Dairy products; Meat products; 
Other food. 
5  Textile & Apparel  Textile mills; Apparel and other textile products; Leather. 
6  Wood & Paper  Lumber and Wood; Furniture and fixtures; Paper. 
7 Chemicals  Chemicals. 
8  Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology  Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
9  Medical Equipment & Medical 
Electronics 
Measurement and control. 
10  Plastics, Polymers & Rubber  Rubber and plastic. 
11  Glass, Clay & Cement  Petrochemicals; Stone, clay and glass products. 
12  Primary Metals  Metal – Primary. 
13  Fabricated Metals  Metal – Products. 
14  Industrial  Machinery  &  Tools  Construction and related machinery; Engines and turbines; Farm and garden 
machinery; Machinery. 
15  Industrial Process Equipment & Misc. 
Machinery 
Other industrial and process equipment machinery. 
16  Office Equipment & Cameras  Photographic equipments. 
17  Heating, Ventilation, Refrigeration  Other machinery 
18  Computers & Peripherals  Computer and data processing and services; Computers and office equipment. 
19  Telecommunications  Telecommunication equipment; Household audio and video equipment; 
Telecommunication services. 
20  Semiconductors & Electronics  Semiconductors; Other electronics. 
21  Measurement & Control Equipment  Measurement and control. 
22  Electrical  Appliances  &  Components  Electric lighting and wiring equipment; Household appliances; Miscellaneous 
electrical equipment & supplies. 
23  Motor Vehicles & Parts  Automotive; Motor vehicles and passenger car bodies; Motor vehicles parts and 
accessories; Motorcycles, bicycles and parts; truck and bus bodies. 
24  Aerospace & Parts  Aircraft; Aircraft engines; Aircraft parts and auxiliary equpment; Guided missiles, 
space vehicles, parts. 
25  Other transport  Other transport; Railroads; Water transportation. 
26  Misc. Manufacturing  General building contractors; Heavy construction, except building; Miscellaneous 
manufacturing; Non metallic minerals, except fuel; Special trade contractors. 
27  Others  Printing, publishing and allied industries. 
Source: elaborations from Techline (1999) and SIC classification.  
 
Table A4. Number of technological alliances by sector and region  





Chemicals & Pharma  Chemicals   233 30     177 440
Chemicals & Pharma  Petrochemicals   86 8     97 191
Chemicals & Pharma  Pharmaceuticals   218       373 591
Electrical equipment  Electrical equipment   31 307 1  108 447
Electronics Other  electronics   274 295 4  529 1102
ICT Computers  6 327     1531 1864
ICT Telecommunications  76 77      615 768
Machinery Machinery     90     53 143
Metal Metal   50 73     18 141
Other Manufacturing  Food and tobacco   10 11     16 37
Other Manufacturing  Wood and paper         2 3 23
Transportation equipment  Aerospace   36 16 20  216 288
Transportation equipment  Automotive   171 75 16  205 467
   76 1192 1232 41 3961 6502
Source: elaborations from SDC (1999). 
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Table A5. Number of production and marketing alliances by sector and region  





Chemicals & Pharma  Chemicals   332 30     179 541
Chemicals & Pharma  Petrochemicals   467 18     438 923
Chemicals & Pharma  Pharmaceuticals   66       73 139
Electrical equipment  Electrical equipment   94 158 2  157 411
Electronics Other  electronics   239 198 0  183 620
ICT Computers  7 116     585 708
ICT Telecommunications  67 64      434 565
Machinery Machinery     68     93 161
Metal Metal   160 135     56 351
Other Manufacturing  Food and tobacco   59 4     92 155
Other Manufacturing  Wood and paper         3 2 32
Transportation equipment  Aerospace   59 27 111  176 373
Transportation equipment  Automotive   353 242 38  228 861
   67 1900 996 151 2726 5840
Source: elaborations from SDC (1999). 
 
Table A6. Herfindahl indexes of sample firms, 1990-1997 






Aerospace  AlliedSignal Inc  0,081 0,16 0,17 
Aerospace  BF Goodrich Co  0,128 0,39 0,59 
Aerospace  Boeing Co, The  0,084 0,38 0,47 
Aerospace  British Aerospace PLC  0,127 0,31 0,21 
Aerospace  Daewoo Electronics Co., Ltd.  0,177 0,18 0,2 
Aerospace  General Dynamics Corp  0,166 0,17 0,25 
Aerospace  Lockheed Martin Corp.  0,074 0,26 0,23 
Aerospace  McDonnell Douglas Corporation  0,086 0,24 0,45 
Aerospace  Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Inc  0,084 0,16 0,14 
Aerospace  Northrop Grumman Corporation  0,086 0,38 0,56 
Aerospace  Rockwell International Corp  0,098 0,14 0,37 
Aerospace  Rolls-Royce PLC  0,201 0,26 0,52 
Aerospace  Textron Inc  0,112 0,55 1 
Aerospace  United Technologies Corp  0,116 0,22 0,24 
Chemicals  Akzo Nobel NV  0,165 0,38 0,43 
Chemicals  Asahi Chemical Industry Co Ltd  0,158 0,2 0,4 
Chemicals  BASF Group  0,236 0,44 0,46 
Chemicals  Bridgestone Corp  0,203 0,25 0,51 
Chemicals  BTR PLC  0,121,  0,18 
Chemicals  Colgate Palmolive Co  0,472 0,56 0,48 
Chemicals  Degussa AG  0,213 0,31 0,26 
Chemicals  Dow Chemical Co  0,204 0,29 0,31 
Chemicals  E I DuPont de Nemours & Co  0,142 0,13 0,17 
Chemicals  Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co  0,329 1 0,36 
Chemicals  Henkel KGAA  0,219 0,76 0,83 
Chemicals  Hoechst AG  0,256 0,35 0,41 
Chemicals  Imperial Chemical Industries PLC  0,193 0,34 0,67 
Chemicals  Mitsubishi Gas Chemical Co  0,235 0,51 0,48 
Chemicals  Montedison SpA  0,296 0,43 0,18 
Chemicals  Procter & Gamble Co, The  0,178 0,37 0,38 
Chemicals  Rhone Poulenc SA  0,235 0,45 0,47 
Computers  3COM Corp.  0,419 0,49 1 
Computers  Apple Computer Inc.  0,427 0,71 0,75 
Computers  Compaq Computer Corp.  0,359 0,56 0,72 
Computers  Dell Computer Corp  0,3 0,72 1 
Computers  Digital Equipment Corp.  0,389 0,62 0,83 
Computers  Electronic Data Sys Corp  0,42 1 0,72 
Computers  EMC Corp  0,578 1 1 
Computers  Fujitsu Limited  0,204 0,5 0,37   28






Computers  Harris Corp  0,232 0,3 0,38 
Computers  Hewlett-Packard Company  0,146 0,51 0,6 
Computers  IBM  0,289 0,53 0,69 
Computers  Lexmark Int'l Inc  0,305 1, 
Computers  Microsoft Corp  0,732 0,75 1 
Computers  NCR Corporation  0,202 0,88 0,8 
Computers  NEC Corporation  0,224 0,33 0,29 
Computers  OKI Electric Industry Co Ltd  0 , 20 , 3 60 , 3 8  
Computers  Oracle Corp.  0,686 0,83 1 
Computers  Pitney Bowes Incorporated  0,187 0,56, 
Computers  Racal Electronics PLC  0,28 0,72 0,39 
Computers  Seagate Technology  0,534 0,64 1 
Computers  Silicon Graphics Inc.  0,466 0,62 0,81 
Computers  Sun Microsystems Inc  0,493 0,56 0,74 
Computers  Unisys Corp  0,311 0,38 0,62 
Computers  Wang Laboratories Inc  0,725 0,64 1 
Electrical equipment  ABB Asea Brown Boveri  0,09 0,15 0,11 
Electrical equipment  AMP Incorporated  0,486 0,21 0,33 
Electrical equipment  Electrolux AB  0,115 0,28 0,33 
Electrical equipment  Emerson Electric Company  0,11 0,38 0,44 
Electrical equipment  General Electric Co  0,072 0,11 0,14 
Electrical equipment  Hitachi Ltd  0,142 0,23 0,1 
Electrical equipment  Samsung Group  0,166 1 0,5 
Electrical equipment  Sankyo Co Ltd  0,337 0,33 0,16 
Electrical equipment  Sharp Corporation  0,191 0,34 0,29 
Electrical equipment  Toshiba Corporation  0,142 0,27 0,17 
Electrical equipment  Whirlpool Corp  0,153 1 0,4 
Food and tobacco  Coca Cola Co, The  0,23 0,28 0,96 
Food and tobacco  Conagra, Inc.  0,248 0,38 0,57 
Food and tobacco  Japan Tobacco Inc  0,184 0,66 0,5 
Food and tobacco  Nabisco Group Holdings Corp.  0,652,  , 
Food and tobacco  Nestle SA  0,192 0,5 0,76 
Food and tobacco  Philip Morris Companies Inc  0,322 0,63 0,82 
Food and tobacco  Sara Lee Corp  0,222 0,33 0,52 
Food and tobacco  Snow Brand Milk Products Co. Ltd.  0,24 1 0,5 
Food and tobacco  Unilever NV  0,332 0,34 0,38 
Machinery  American Standard Cos Inc DE  0,133,  0,5 
Machinery  Applied Materials Inc  0,204 0,52 1 
Machinery  Baker Hughes Inc  0,19 0,5 0,38 
Machinery  Black & Decker Corp, The  0,127 1 0,5 
Machinery  Brunswick Corp  0,172 0,63 0,33 
Machinery  Caterpillar Inc  0,134 0,22 0,5 
Machinery  Cummins Engine Company Inc  0,301 0,29 0,33 
Machinery  Deere & Company  0,208,  1 
Machinery  Dover Corporation  0,142,  0,5 
Machinery  FMC Corp  0,107 0,56 0,22 
Machinery  Halliburton Company  0,273 0,36 0,38 
Machinery  Ingersoll-Rand Company  0,144 0,5 0,56 
Machinery  Kawasaki Heavy Industries LTD  0,086 0,25 0,22 
Machinery  Komatsu Limited  0,107 0,33 0,3 
Machinery  Mitsubishi Electric Corp  0,14 0,32 0,2 
Machinery  Parker-Hannifin Corp  0,153,  0,38 
Machinery  Tyco International LTD  0,222,  , 
Metal  Alcatel  0,219 0,42 0,37 
Metal  Aluminum Company of America  0,121 0,44 0,5 
Metal  Ball Corp  0,144 0,28 0,47 
Metal  Gillette Co The  0,125 0,5 0,17 
Metal  Illinois Tool Works Inc  0,173 0,5 1 
Metal  Kobe Steel Limited  0,083 0,24 0,29 
Metal  Mannesmann AG  0,146 0,28 0,16 
Metal  Metallgesellschaft AG  0,116 0,21 0,25 
Metal  Nippon Steel Corporation  0,088 0,18 0,21 
Metal  NKK Corporation  0,102 0,2 0,35 
Metal  Pechiney SA  0,129,  0,5 
Metal  Reynolds Metals Co  0,174 0,63 0,19 
Metal  Sumitomo Electric Industries Ltd  0,099 0,34 0,19 
Metal  Sumitomo Metals Industries Ltd  0,113 0,14 0,16 
Metal  Thyssen AG  0,115 0,21 0,15 
Metal  Usinor Sacilor  0,188,  0,5 
Metal  Viag AG  0,13 0,33 0,18   29






Other electronics  Allegheny Technologies Inc.  0,086,  1 
Other electronics  Alps Electric Company Limited  0,182 0,31 0,43 
Other electronics  Canon Inc  0,191 0,33 0,42 
Other electronics  Cisco Systems Inc.  0,721 0,55 0,48 
Other electronics  Eastman Kodak Co  0,19 0,22 0,15 
Other electronics  Fuji Photo Film Co Ltd  0,226 0,13 0,27 
Other electronics  Honeywell Inc  0,078 0,21 0,26 
Other electronics  Intel Corp  0,401 0,33 0,56 
Other electronics  Kyocera Corporation  0,119 1, 
Other electronics  Litton Industries Inc  0,189 0,38 0,31 
Other electronics  Matsushita Electric Industrial Co Ltd  0,152 0,22 0,22 
Other electronics  Micron Technology, Inc.  0,281 0,58 0,56 
Other electronics  Omron Corporation  0,149 0,45 0,36 
Other electronics  Philips Electronics N.V.  0,16 0,22 0,2 
Other electronics  Pioneer Electronic Corporation  0,283 0,44 0,82 
Other electronics  Raytheon Company  0,116 0,18 0,17 
Other electronics  Ricoh Company Ltd  0,24 0,28 0,34 
Other electronics  Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.  0,182 0,63, 
Other electronics  Siemens AG  0,093 0,2 0,12 
Other electronics  Sony Corporation  0,242 0,33 0,35 
Other electronics  Tandy Corp.  0,338 0,72 0,56 
Other electronics  TDK Corporation  0,175 0,32 0,38 
Other electronics  Texas Instruments Incorporated  0,212 0,35 0,28 
Other electronics  Thermo Electron Corp  0,108 1 0,28 
Other electronics  TRW Incorporated  0,201 0,21 0,2 
Other electronics  Western Digital Corp.  0,264 0,42 1 
Other electronics  Xerox Corporation  0,267 0,6 0,54 
Other electronics  Zenith Electronics Corp  0,381 0,54 1 
Petrochemicals  Amoco Corp  0,205 0,2 0,38 
Petrochemicals  Atlantic Richfield Co  0,183 0,59 0,53 
Petrochemicals  British Petroleum Co PLC  0,228 0,87 0,33 
Petrochemicals  Chevron Corp  0,313 0,31 0,45 
Petrochemicals  ENI-Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi  0,238 0,59 0,28 
Petrochemicals  Exxon Corp  0,223 0,46 0,35 
Petrochemicals  Idemitsu Kosan KK  0,24 0,22 0,42 
Petrochemicals  Japan Energy Corp.  0,102 1 0,22 
Petrochemicals  Mobil Corporation  0,279 0,51 0,43 
Petrochemicals  Norsk Hydro A/S  0,128 0,28 0,21 
Petrochemicals  Occidental Petroleum Corp  0,382 0,56 0,51 
Petrochemicals  Petrofina SA  0,345 0,5 0,54 
Petrochemicals  Phillips Petroleum Co  0,291 0,44 0,5 
Petrochemicals  Royal Dutch Petroleum Co  0,243 0,5 0,32 
Petrochemicals  Schlumberger Ltd  0,226 0,45 0,24 
Petrochemicals  Soc Nationale Elf Aquitaine  0,227 0,42 0,29 
Petrochemicals  Texaco Inc  0,269 0,28 0,58 
Petrochemicals  Total S.A.  0,146 0,5 0,55 
Petrochemicals  USX Corp  0,221 0,22 0,33 
Petrochemicals  Veba AG  0,171 0,32 0,19 
Pharmaceuticals  Abbott Laboratories  0,25 0,59 0,44 
Pharmaceuticals  American Home Products Corp  0,303 0,76 1 
Pharmaceuticals  Bayer AG  0,262 0,31 0,36 
Pharmaceuticals  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co  0,296 0,65 0,64 
Pharmaceuticals  Eli Lilly and Co  0,453 0,71 0,54 
Pharmaceuticals  Glaxo Wellcome PLC  0,411 0,66 1 
Pharmaceuticals  Johnson & Johnson  0,305 0,56 0,41 
Pharmaceuticals  Merck & Co Inc  0,437 0,82 0,59 
Pharmaceuticals  Novartis AG  0,258 1 0,33 
Pharmaceuticals  Pfizer Inc  0,321 0,55 0,43 
Pharmaceuticals  Roche Holding Ltd  0,411 0,88 0,52 
Pharmaceuticals  SmithKline Beecham Group PLC  0,447 0,78 0,8 
Pharmaceuticals  Warner-Lambert Co  0,285 0,83 0,5 
Telecommunications  A T & T Corp.  0,646 0,38 0,36 
Telecommunications  Ameritech Corp.  0,538 0,53 0,63 
Telecommunications  BCE Incorporated  0,251 0,45 0,65 
Telecommunications  Bell Atlantic Corp  0,677 0,47 0,51 
Telecommunications  BellSouth Corp.  0,613 0,6 0,59 
Telecommunications  British Telecommunications PLC  0,268 0,39 0,59 
Telecommunications  CBS Corp  0,108,  0,72 
Telecommunications  General Elec Co PLC, The  0,128 1, 
Telecommunications  GTE Corp  0,131 0,42 0,59   30






Telecommunications  Lucent Technologies  0,224 0,22 0,63 
Telecommunications  MCI Worldcom, Inc.  0,64 0,48 0,63 
Telecommunications  Motorola Inc  0,247 0,3 0,37 
Telecommunications  Nokia Group  0,492 0,6 0,37 
Telecommunications  Northern Telecom Ltd  0,253,  , 
Telecommunications  SBC Communications, Inc.  0,412 0,5 1 
Telecommunications  Sprint Corp  0,687 0,52 0,64 
Telecommunications  US West Communications Inc.  0,512 0,63 0,76 
Transportation equipments  Bayerische Motoren Werke Ag  0,338 0,22 0,52 
Transportation equipments  Chrysler Corp  0,184 0,2 1 
Transportation equipments  Daimler-Benz Ag  0,129 0,13 0,18 
Transportation equipments  Dana Corporation  0,305 0,38 0,54 
Transportation equipments  Denso Corp.  0,132,  1 
Transportation equipments  Fiat S.P.A.  0,141 0,27 0,27 
Transportation equipments  Ford Motor Company  0,163 0,3 0,39 
Transportation equipments  Fuji Heavy Industries Co Ltd  0,334 0,33 0,5 
Transportation equipments  General Motors Corporation  0,126 0,22 0,3 
Transportation equipments  Honda Giken Kogyo KK  0,207 0,3 0,66 
Transportation equipments  Hyundai Corp  0,176 0,24 0,28 
Transportation equipments  Isuzu Motors Limited  0,31 1 0,78 
Transportation equipments  Lear Corp  0,171 1 0,56 
Transportation equipments  Man AG  0,178 0,38 0,18 
Transportation equipments  Mazda Motor Corporation  0,341 0,42 0,77 
Transportation equipments  Mitsubishi Motors Corp  0,422 0,56 1 
Transportation equipments  Nissan Motor Co Ltd  0,244 0,15 0,49 
Transportation equipments  Renault, Regie National Des Usines  0,173,  1 
Transportation equipments  Robert Bosch GmbH  0,201 0,22 0,22 
Transportation equipments  Suzuki Motor Corp  0,478 0,56 1 
Transportation equipments  Toyota Motor Corporation  0,224 0,22 0,42 
Transportation equipments  Volkswagen AG  0,381 0,28 0,66 
Transportation equipments  Volvo AB  0,18 0,25 0,64 
Wood and paper  Avery Dennison Corporation  0,149 0,25 0,5 
Wood and paper  Boise Cascade Corp  0,262,  1 
Wood and paper  Georgia-Pacific Corporation  0,187 1 1 
Wood and paper  International Paper Company  0,152 0,56 0,38 
Wood and paper  Kimberly-Clark Corporation  0,164 0,5 0,47 
Wood and paper  Mead Corp  0,248 1 1 
Wood and paper  Union Camp Corporation  0,163,  1 
Wood and paper  Westvaco Corp  0,165 0,5 1 
Wood and paper  Weyerhaeuser Company  0,119 0,56 0,76 
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